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“PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS” IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
PROGRAMS: MUST THE COURT DEFER TO THE
UNIVERSITY ON FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS?
Emily Deyring*
I. INTRODUCTION
Free speech on college campuses has become a contentious issue with
some public universities and state legislatures recently implementing
policies and guidelines that attempt to prevent “violent, unruly disruptions”
on campus.1 Student groups have made their way to federal court in thusfar-unsuccessful claims that universities violated the First Amendment2 by
closing the campus to controversial outside speakers, such as former
Breitbart senior editor Milo Yiannopoulos.3
A public university has the right to make its platforms unavailable to
speakers who do not further the institution’s goals.4 Nonetheless, it remains
unclear exactly how far beyond its physical boundaries the public university
may reach into its students’ speech without violating their constitutional
rights.5 Furthermore, circuit courts and state courts have struggled to apply
the standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood School District v.
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1
Jeremy W. Peters, In Name of Free Speech, States Crack Down on Campus Protests,
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/us/politics/campusspeech-protests.html.
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . .”)
3
Young America’s Found. v. Napolitano, No. 17-cv-02255-MMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70108 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018). See also Robles v. In the Name of Humanity, We
Refuse to Accept a Fascist Am., No. 17-cv-04864-CW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93819 (N.D.
Cal. June 4, 2018) (denying plaintiff’s claim that the University of California Berkeley
violated her First Amendment rights by willfully withholding police protection at a
Yiannopoulos event).
4
See Catherine J. Ross, Campus Discourse and Democracy: Free Speech Principles
Provide Sound Guidance Even After the Tumult of 2017, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 801
(2018).
5
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 1801, 1834 (2017).
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Kuhlmeier6 decision—whether the university’s censorship of its students’
speech is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”7
Particularly troubling is a string of cases involving “professional standards”
at public universities.8 The Supreme Court has yet to form a test for deciding
whether these public university programs can restrict students’ free speech
rights off-campus under the guise of professional standards.9 For example,
in 2012, Central Lakes College student Craig Keefe was expelled from a
nursing program for making incendiary comments about his classmates and
instructors on his Facebook page.10 Keefe sued the school for infringing his
First Amendment right to free speech.11 In 2016, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Keefe v. Adams, found that the school did not infringe the
student’s rights.12 The Eighth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s
Hazelwood standard that a school can constitutionally restrict studentproduced content if the restriction is “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”13
6

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 273. Compare Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (citing Hazelwood to support deference to the
university); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Hazelwood
standard applies to a nursing student who made controversial statements about classmates on
his Facebook page); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that Hazelwood is the appropriate standard when evaluating a challenge to a university’s
acting class that required a student to speak offensive words in a script); Brown v. Li, 308
F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood in a case involving a master’s thesis); Bishop
v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying Hazelwood in a case involving challenge
to university restrictions on professor’s classroom speech), with Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d
816, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e need not consider whether the principles of
Hazelwood . . . apply with full force in a university setting—a question neither we . . . nor
the Supreme Court . . . have definitively answered.”), and Brown, 308 F.3d at 957 (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting) (“Because the reasons underlying the . . . speech rights of high school youths
do not apply in the adult world of college and graduate students . . . I cannot agree with . . .
[the] conclusion that the First Amendment standard established in Hazelwood applies at the
university level.”).
8
See, e.g., Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532; Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.
2015); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
9
Clay Calvert, Professional Standards and the First Amendment in Higher Education:
When Institutional Academic Freedom Collides with Student Speech Rights, 91 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 611, 621 (2017) (quoting Professor Alan Chen, who stated that “the Supreme Court
sporadically has made compelling statements about the importance of academic freedom, yet,
it has been either unable or unwilling to develop a coherent framework for assessing the scope
of constitutional academic freedom rights”). See also Michael K. Park, Restricting
Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality of Regulating Students’ Off-campus Online
Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405, 427 (2016) (“Thus far the
Supreme Court has never . . . provided any guidance as to whether school speech precedents
apply with equal force in the university context.”).
10
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 525.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 533.
13
Id. at 531 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
7
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Some commentators have argued that Keefe is deeply flawed because
it essentially declared that professional students sign away their First
Amendment rights by enrolling in a “professional” program that holds
students to a corresponding standard.14 Furthermore, other scholars have
criticized Keefe because that case involved a nursing student’s speech offcampus; Hazelwood, in contrast, examined high school students’ speech in a
curricular setting on-campus (a student newspaper).15 Despite the Supreme
Court’s holding in Hazelwood that public K-12 schools may constitutionally
restrict student journalists, the American Society of News Editors and the
Society of Professional Journalists have passed resolutions in support of
legislation that they say would protect student publications from retaliation,
such as defunding.16 The Supreme Court declined to review the Eighth
Circuit’s holding in Keefe,17 potentially eroding university students’ free
speech protections off-campus.
First Amendment scholar Professor Clay Calvert has proposed a fourpronged test for courts in deciding whether a public university’s professional
standard is constitutional.18 Calvert based this test off the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in Oyama v. University of Hawaii, which upheld
a student’s expulsion from a teaching program.19 While the test provides an
improved framework for courts’ treatment of professional student speech
off-campus, it leaves open too many opportunities for universities to burden
student speech. If the Supreme Court were to apply this test to recent cases,
it would still infringe students’ First Amendment rights, causing grave
consequences for the students’ careers and the industries in which they seek
employment.
14
See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 9, at 613. See also Lindsie Trego, Article, When a
Student’s Speech Belongs to the University: Keefe, Hazelwood, and the Expanding Role of
the Government Speech Doctrine on Campus, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98, 115–16
(“Scholars have expressed concern that the government speech doctrine is quickly expanding
and threatens to swallow the First Amendment, and the professional student speech doctrine
is further evidence of this expansion.”).
15
See Kai Wahrmann-Harry, Note, The Next Step in Student Speech Analysis? How the
Eighth Circuit Further Complicates the First Amendment Rights of University Students in
Keefe v. Adams, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 442–44 (2018).
16
AM. SOC’Y OF NEWS EDITORS, RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWS EDITORS IN SUPPORT OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR STUDENT
JOURNALISTS AND ADVISERS (2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.spl/1333_asne_resolution_in_support_of_student_journali
sts_and_advisers_2016o.pdf; Society of Professional Journalists, Resolution in Support of
Enhanced Protections for Student Journalists (2016), https://www.spj.org/res2016.asp#4.
17
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
18
Calvert, supra note 9, at 648. Under the four prongs of Calvert’s suggested test, a
court must ensure that a public university’s enforcement of a professional standard does not
violate a student’s right to free speech by evaluating the standard for precision, essentiality,
contextuality, and proportionality. Id.
19
813 F.3d 850 (2015).
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This Comment examines how courts adjudicate professionalism
requirements as applied to public university student speech off-campus.
Specifically, this Comment evaluates Calvert’s proposed test for evaluating
the constitutionality of universities’ professional standard,20 arguing that the
test is too deferential to the university’s judgment and could lead to
numerous unforeseen consequences that would cause harm to students,
especially those vulnerable to being marginalized. Part II focuses on the
history of free speech on- and off-campus. Part III addresses the “legitimate
pedagogical concern” standard and the role of the university in enforcing
professional standards for credentialing professional programs. Part IV
critiques Professor Clay Calvert’s proposed four-pronged test for
professional standards and suggests potential unforeseen adverse
consequences that might arise if the Supreme Court were to adopt this
analysis; Part IV also offers alternative considerations for scholars and jurists
when evaluating professional standards cases through the lens of the First
Amendment.
II. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH ON- AND OFF-CAMPUS
College campuses have long been venues of conflicting interests21
between students’ First Amendment right to free speech and universities’
interest in fulfilling their educational goals.22 Beginning with The Civil
Rights Cases23 in 1883, federal courts have laid a groundwork upon which
to evaluate the university’s role as a state actor. Public universities are
considered state actors24 and are thus bound to uphold the Constitution.25
The Supreme Court considers schools to be a part of the “marketplace of
ideas” and has thus prohibited them from infringing speech based on the

20

Calvert, supra note 9, at 648.
Andrew Hartman, People Always Think Students Are Hostile to Speech. They Never
Really Are., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/peoplealways-think-students-are-hostile-to-speech-they-never-really-are/2018/03/15/cc53cc3a286c-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef_story.html?utm_term=.a8691f7a0b4b
(“The
college
campus . . . has always been a breeding ground for protest.”).
22
See, e.g., IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d
386, 393 (4th Cir. 1993) (“We agree wholeheartedly that it is the University officials’
responsibility, even their obligation, to achieve the goals they have set. On the other hand, a
public university has many constitutionally permissible means to protect female and minority
students.”).
23
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“All agree that . . . a public university, is a state actor . . . .”).
25
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–24 (1961) (establishing
that a private business acting in close relationship to the government is sufficient to be
considered “state action”). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH
ON CAMPUS 52–53 (2017).
21
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viewpoints contained therein.26 Although courts have examined universitylevel “professional standard” speech off-campus in a few cases,27 the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific issue of university student
speech off-campus.28 This dearth of guidance leaves a sense of uncertainty
among students and academic administrators, but also presents an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to provide clarity.
A. Free Speech and Public High Schools
Through a string of cases, the Supreme Court has established clear First
Amendment jurisprudence within non-secondary public schools. In the
context of public high school students’ speech on campus, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District set forth a test allowing
regulation of student speech by high school officials if the speech causes
substantial disruption or materially interferes with the learning
environment.29
Students in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State. . . . [Students] may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to
regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views.30
Tinker also made clear that while school officials may regulate student
speech in limited circumstances of substantial disruption or material
interference, students’ free speech rights extend beyond “carefully restricted
circumstances,” such as classroom discussion:31 “[i]t can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”32 The question remains: How
far and how high does the schoolhouse gate go?

26

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 71 (1983) (citing
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); accord Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
27
See, e.g., Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816
N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
28
Calvert, supra note 9, at 621.
29
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
30
Id. at 511.
31
Id. at 513. (“We properly read [the Constitution] to permit reasonable regulation of
speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the
permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a
pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.”).
32
Id. at 506.
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Although Supreme Court cases following Tinker have applied the
“substantial disruption and material interference” test to other situations
involving students, these cases have generally been restricted to kindergarten
through high school.33 Specifically, in 1986, the Court differentiated
between students in public school and “adults in other settings”34 in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, when it held that a high school may
discipline a student for having made an “offensively lewd and indecent
speech” at a school assembly.35
In 1988, the Court further refined its stance toward speech in high
schools in Hazelwood, holding that “[a] school need not tolerate speech that
is inconsistent with . . . its educational mission.”36 Although Hazelwood has
been invoked in multiple cases involving student speech, the case arose from
a high school newspaper’s activity.37 The Court was clear that restricting
student speech activity is permissible regardless of where it occurs, provided
that the expression can be considered part of the school’s curriculum.38 The
Court in Hazelwood also emphasized that the decision stood as an exception
to the Tinker standard, rather than as a revamped standard.39 This is crucial
to note when examining cases where courts have applied both Hazelwood
and Tinker to the university setting. Some scholars have argued that
Hazelwood applies to viewpoint-specific student speech because “schools
have an interest in maintaining their own messaging as they carry out their
educational function.”40
The Court similarly invoked Fraser in Morse v. Frederick in 2007,
when it held that it was constitutional for a high school to confiscate a

33

Meg Penrose, Sharing Stupid $h*t With Friends and Followers: The First Amendment
Rights of College Athletes to Use Social Media, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 449, 477
(2014).
34
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
35
Id. at 685.
36
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
37
Id. at 262.
38
Id. at 271 (explaining that [t]heatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school . . . may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not
they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.).
39
Id. at 272–73 (“[W]e conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining
when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
expression.”).
40
Brad Dickens, Comment, Reclaiming Hazelwood: Public School Classrooms and a
Return to the Supreme Court’s Vision for Viewpoint-Specific Speech Regulation Policy, 16
RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 529, 531 (2013).
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student’s banner and suspend the student on the basis of the student’s speech
content.41 In that case, the Court decided that the student’s banner, which
read “BONG HiTS [sic] 4 JESUS,” promotes illegal drug use,42 and therefore
is not protected speech.43 In his opinion, Justice Roberts compared the facts
of the case to those in Fraser, noting that if the speech in that case had
occurred “outside the school context, it would have been protected.”44 The
Court also expressed uncertainty regarding schools’ boundaries and student
speech,45 marking the closest it has come to deciding how far a public school
can reach student speech off-campus.
B. Free Speech and Public Universities
As of 2013, no court had applied Fraser or Morse to the university
student context; furthermore, no court had decided whether extracurricular
university student speech off-campus can be restricted.46 In Ward v. Polite,
a student seeking a master’s degree in counseling was expelled from her
program because she had asked to refer her gay and lesbian clients to other
counselors, in violation of the American Counseling Association’s code of
ethics.47 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a school’s curriculum
itself is protected speech, and that regardless of the age of the student, the
Hazelwood standard applies.48 It also decided in Ward that the university
has a right to adopt anti-discrimination policies.49 Ward sits at the
intersection of religious rights, discrimination, and free speech, which this
Comment does not seek to resolve. Nevertheless, Ward provides an
interesting glimpse into how courts treat student speech within a curricular
setting (“on-campus”).
In the Supreme Court’s 1972 Healy v. James decision, a public
university was held to have unconstitutionally infringed students’ rights to
free speech when the school refused to recognize a student group.50 This is
an important case for public universities and on-campus extracurricular
speech.51 In the spirit of Tinker, Healy went a step further to explain that
41

551 U.S. 393, 397.
Id. at 397, 401–02.
43
Id. at 408.
44
Id. at 405.
45
Id. at 401 (“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should
apply school speech precedents.”).
46
Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification
Cases, 11 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 382, 388 (2013).
47
667 F.3d 727, 731–32 (6th Cir. 2012).
48
Id. at 733 (“The key word is student.”).
49
Id. at 738–39.
50
408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972).
51
Id. at 171.
42
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“state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of
the First Amendment.”52 The holding in Healy supports an argument against
an orthodoxy of opinions on college campuses.53
C. When Student Speech Takes a Hike Off-Campus
Some judges and scholars nevertheless distinguish the holding in
Hazelwood, which addressed high school speech, from the rights afforded to
students at universities and post-graduate programs.54 For example,
Hazelwood has been applied to public professional school students’ speech
off-campus, which can be problematic and far-reaching when discussing
post-graduate student speech in public universities.55 Courts have also
looked to the Tinker standard to evaluate whether the off-campus speech
caused or could cause a potential disruption to the learning environment.56
Some courts have explicitly not decided the issue of whether Tinker and its
progeny apply to off-campus speech.57
In 2016, a federal district court held that a public high school did not
infringe a student’s First Amendment rights when the school suspended that
student for having posted bomb threats on his Facebook page. 58 The judge,
pointing to Tinker, opined that it was not the location of the speech that

52

Id. at 180.
Id. (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”).
54
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 542 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Hazelwood because
“Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot be reasonably
attributed to the school”); McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he teachings of . . . decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools[]
cannot be taken as gospel in cases involving public universities. Any application of free
speech doctrine derived from these decisions to the university setting should be scrutinized
carefully.”). See, e.g., Wahrmann-Harry, supra note 15, at 445–46.
55
See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012) (“Applying the
[Hazelwood] legitimate pedagogical concerns standard to a professional student’s Facebook
posts would give universities wide-ranging authority to constrain offensive or controversial
Internet activity by requiring only that a school’s actions be ‘reasonably related’ to ‘legitimate
pedagogical concerns.’”) (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73). But see Keefe, 840 F.3d at
531 (“College administrators and educators in a professional school have discretion to require
compliance with recognized standards of the profession, both on and off campus, ‘so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”) (citing Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 273).
56
E.g., Keefe, 840 F.3d at 531 n.6 (“Tinker permits disciplining public school students
for off-campus postings ‘where it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the
school community and cause a substantial disruption to the educational setting.’”) (citing
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012)).
57
See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 303 n.9 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011)) (“We have not yet
decided whether Tinker is limited to on-campus speech.”).
58
R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 640 (2016).
53
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mattered, but rather that the speech would cause a substantial disruption.59
In contrast, the Third Circuit in 2011 decided that an eighth-grader did
not cause a substantial disruption when she made fun of her school’s
principal on her MySpace page, and that the school infringed her First
Amendment rights when it suspended her.60 The court here explicitly stated
that “Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.”61
In 2011, the Third Circuit went further to support a public school
student’s right to free speech off-campus.62 It held en banc in Layshock v.
Hermitage School District that a high school senior should not have been
disciplined for posting a “parody profile” of the school principal on
MySpace.63 The student had accessed the profile at times from within the
classroom.64 The school alleged that the student’s speech was defamatory
and began on campus, and that therefore the school district was justified in
regulating the student’s conduct.65 Regardless, there was no allegation of
substantial disruption (the Tinker standard) caused by the student’s MySpace
activity.66
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2013’s Wynar v.
Douglas County School District that even though a high school student’s offcampus speech (instant messages on MySpace) met the Tinker standard to
be constitutionally protected, the school was justified in temporarily
expelling67 the student for making an identifiable threat of violence toward
the school (school shooting).68 This case is distinguishable because it would
likely be considered a true threat and therefore not protected speech under
the First Amendment.69
Similar to the circumstances surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Wynar, in 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a public high
school’s discipline of a student who had recorded a rap song (off-campus
speech) containing language that described violent acts against school
teacher-coaches.70 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because the speech was

59

Id.
J.S. v. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011).
61
Id. at 932.
62
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
63
Id. at 219.
64
Id. at 209.
65
Id. at 214.
66
Id.
67
The school board expelled the student for ninety days. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch.
Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013).
68
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1062.
69
See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
70
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
60
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“threatening, harassing, and intimidating,” it could cause a reasonable
expectation on the part of the faculty that there would be a substantial
disruption.71
As this Comment examines infra in addressing Tatro, Keefe, and
Oyama, various courts’ applications of the Tinker “substantial disruption”
standard are inconsistent and should be irrelevant to graduate student speech
off-campus. Tinker is for pure speech on-campus and in the K-12 context.
D. Free Speech and the “Professional Program” Student
Defining a “professional program” presents its own set of challenges
for a court. One way to define it would be for a court to consider
“professional” programs to be “situations where students are performing
duties otherwise performed by professionals, under professional supervision.
For example, law school clinics, where students are dealing with clients; or
medical school rotations; or student teaching; or . . . interacting with
cadavers.”72 This approach fails to address the on-campus/off-campus
distinction as outlined in Morse v. Frederick,73 and leaves the university able
to reach into most aspects of students’ lives before they have attained
professional status.
The Court should define this “professional” capacity as narrowly as
possible, including only those professions for which the state has agreed to
confer statutory licensing requirements. This would provide protection for
student journalists, for example, and other non-licensed professions.74
Through various circuit court decisions, the university’s right to impose
professionalism requirements on its students has been consistently upheld.75
Courts characterize the decision on the part of the university to be academic,
not disciplinary.76 Most cases here do not involve free speech, and are within
the world of what should properly be considered curricular conduct, not
protected speech off-campus.77 Courts typically defer to the judgment of the
university when finding that a student lacked professionalism in the

71

Id. at 383.
Will Creeley, A Closer Look at Tatro v. Minnesota, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN
EDUC. (FIRE) (June 22, 2012), https://www.thefire.org/a-closer-look-at-tatro-v-university-ofminnesota/.
73
551 U.S. 393.
74
See infra, Part IV, critique of Calvert’s “Essentiality Principle” prong.
75
See Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 2016); Al-Dabagh v. Case W.
Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 2015). See also Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813
F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2015).
76
See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 (1978); Al-Dabagh,
777 F.3d at 360 (“The Committee’s professionalism determination is an academic
judgment.”).
77
See, e.g., Al-Dabagh, 777 F.3d at 359–60.
72
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curricular context (on-campus): “[j]udges are ‘ill-equipped’ to second-guess
the University’s curricular choices.”78
The Supreme Court has also urged deference to the public university’s
academic decisions, restating its “responsibility to safeguard their academic
freedom, ‘a special concern of the First Amendment.’”79 Academic
evaluation should not extend to student speech made in a private capacity
off-campus, which is otherwise protected by the First Amendment.
1. Amanda Tatro: Worthy of Discipline, Protection, or
Both?
A Minnesota Supreme Court case from 2012 examined the tension
between professional conduct standards and First Amendment
jurisprudence. In Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the court evaluated a
mortuary science student’s Facebook comments and found them to be
disrespectful in light of a state statute outlining established standards of
professional conduct for that industry.80 Mortuary student Amanda Tatro’s
Facebook comments, labeled potentially violent by some,81 referred to a
cadaver in her anatomy lab as “Bernie,” presumably as a reference to the
movie “Weekend at Bernie’s.”82 Tatro posted to her “friends” and “friends
of friends,”83 “[g]ive me room, lots of aggression to be taken out with a
trocar.”84 Tatro testified that a “death list” mentioned in one of her Facebook
posts was a reference to the movie “Kill Bill”85: “Who knew embalming lab
was so cathartic! I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a
trocar though. Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the evening updating my
‘Death List #5’.”86 Equally troubling in light of her own death shortly after
the case was decided,87 she posted: “I wish to accompany [the cadaver] to
78
Id. at 359 (quoting Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir.
1988)).
79
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (quoting Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
80
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012).
81
Andrew Beaujon, Amanda Tatro Dead at 31; Challenged University’s Facebook
Policies
on
First
Amendment
Grounds,
POYNTER
(June
26,
2012),
https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2012/amanda-tatro-challenged-universitysfacebook-policies-on-first-amendment-grounds/
82
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512.
83
Tatro v. University of Minnesota, ACLU MINNESOTA, https://www.aclumn.org/en/cases/tatro-v-university-minnesota (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
84
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512. A trocar is “a sharp-pointed surgical instrument fitted with
a cannula and used especially to insert the cannula into a body cavity as a drainage outlet.”
Trocar, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trocar (last
visited Jan. 9, 2019).
85
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 513.
86
Id. at 512.
87
Tatro died about a week after her case was decided; the cause of death could not be
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the retort. Now where will I go or who will I hang with when I need to gather
my sanity?”88
In Tatro, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the university’s rules
were “narrowly tailored” and “directly related to established professional
conduct standards,” which permitted the university to sanction Tatro for her
Facebook statements.89 Tatro, however, argued that the university’s
disciplinary measures would chill student speech beyond their studies—that
the university “cannot impose a broad rule that would prohibit mortuary
science students from criticizing faculty members or posting offensive
statements that are unrelated to the study of human cadavers.”90
Indeed, the case underscores the importance of crafting a narrow rule
that does not chill student speech91 so much that students are unable to learn
effectively92—or, hypothetically, to seek assistance or guidance93—within
the university program. Students would be less likely to report misconduct
among their peers or professors if they perceive it to be potentially careeraltering. “If speech loses its First Amendment protection because it causes
so many grantors to withdraw their support that a program’s viability is
threatened . . . then no student may ever feel safe, in any venue, blowing the
whistle on wrongdoing.”94
confirmed. She was physically disabled and had a central nervous system disorder. Emily
Gurnon, Amanda Tatro Dies; University of Minnesota Student Challenged U’s Facebook
Policies, PIONEER PRESS (last updated Nov. 10, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.twincities.com
/2012/06/25/amanda-tatro-dies-university-of-minnesota-student-challenged-us-facebookpolicies/. Tatro had planned to seek further review of the case. Tatro v. University of
Minnesota, ACLU MINNESOTA, https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/cases/tatro-v-universityminnesota (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
88
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512.
89
Id. at 523.
90
Id. at 521.
91
See Thomas Healy, Who’s Afraid of Free Speech?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
COLUM. U. (July 14, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/news/whos-afraid-free-speech (“One
of the reasons government censorship is so troubling is that the coercive power of the state is
nearly impossible to resist, making its chilling effect not just real but profound.”).
92
See Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 416 (2011) (“If schools start policing and punishing offcampus speech, students’ views of schools, teachers, and administrators may be altered in a
manner that interferes with the learning process itself.”).
93
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Okay to Dismiss Professional School Students for Expressing
‘Views . . . Deemed Not in Alignment with Standards Set by’ Government Authorities, WASH.
POST (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2015/12/29/okay-to-dismiss-professional-school-students-for-expressing-views-deemednot-in-alignment-with-standards-set-by-government-authorities/. Volokh points to the “chill
created by such decisions,” which will cause students to refrain from expressing views that
are “misguided.” Id. Students could similarly be chilled from expressing views that would
evoke an educator’s natural concern for the student’s well-being.
94
Frank D. LoMonte, Free Speech Off-Campus Must Be Protected, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Feb. 5, 2012), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Free-Speech-Off-Campus-Must-
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Of course, professional organizations could argue they have a
compelling interest against students making such comments in the course of
their studies. On behalf of the university in Tatro, the American Board of
Funeral Service Education (ABFSE) argued in its amicus brief that the
university must protect the integrity of “willed body programs,” or “whole
body donations.”95 The implication is that donors or their next of kin would
be less willing to participate in the programs if mortuary students are
permitted to express such statements about cadavers in anatomy labs.96
Willed body programs are largely unregulated and therefore susceptible to
“governmental investigations, donor scrutiny, and a diminishing supply.”97
Regardless, the governmental interest in ensuring a supply of whole body
donations should not outweigh the student’s First Amendment right to free
speech off-campus, in a non-curricular environment. The Tatro court failed
to balance the burden it places on student speech off-campus against the
harm it might have caused the university’s educational mission for students
to engage in disrespectful speech.98
Although some of Tatro’s comments could be seen as troubling or even
vaguely threatening, equally troubling is a “mini-trend” for state actors to
blur the already-thin line between social media rant posts and true threats.99
Allowing students to speak freely off-campus and beyond the curriculum
would not prevent the university or legislature from enacting standards to
ensure confidentiality, nor would it prevent inquiry into speech that is
already not constitutionally protected.
In a positive development for professional-level students, the court in
Tatro declined to evaluate the case under the Tinker standard,
acknowledging that the statements were made on Facebook and could not be
considered substantially disruptive to the curricular environment.100 The
Fifth Circuit, in contrast, was willing to extend the Tinker “substantial

Be/130660.
95
Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Education and the Association of
American Medical Colleges at 14, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012)
(No. A10-1440), https://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/Amicus-Brief-in-Supportof-the-University-of-Minnesota-in-Tatro-v-UMN.pdf.
96
See id. at 15.
97
Allison Slocum, Note, Dearly Departed, Dearly Needed, 24 ELDER L.J. 181, 182
(2016).
98
Joint Brief of Amici Curiae Student Press Law Center and Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education, Inc., at 14, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) (No.
A10-1440), http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/briefs/pdfs/a101440scac1.pdf (stating that the
impact is “simply too attenuated—and . . . would invite too much abuse”).
99
Eric Goldman, Mortuary Sciences College Student Disciplined for Threatening
Facebook Posts—Tatro v. University of Minnesota, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 12,
2011), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/07/mortuary_scienc.htm.
100
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Minn. 2012).
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disruption” standard to off-campus speech when dealing with a high school
student.101 The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to do so here, however,
when dealing with a professional program student.102
Although the court in Tatro declined to apply the Tinker standard, it
invoked the “special characteristics of the academic environment” in
deciding that the university was permitted to discipline Amanda Tatro for
her statements.103 This analysis defers to the university’s contention that it
should be permitted to establish program rules that demand “respect,
discretion, and confidentiality” when dealing with willed cadavers.104 It
bears noting that ABFSE does not appear to have stated in its rules that
“respect, discretion, and confidentiality” are required, nor did it explain these
terms.105 The court in Tatro held that the school’s policy could
constitutionally restrict student speech off-campus as long as the policy is
“narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct
standards.”106
This case opens the door for a public university to discipline a student
for any speech off-campus that it deems violative of “any claimed
curriculum-based reason.”107 This decision is binding only on the state level,
because it is a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nevertheless, a
state supreme court opinion could be persuasive authority to the Supreme
Court when it will inevitably face a similar fact pattern. A Supreme Court
decision on the issue would clarify this open question. The Court should
make clear that graduate student speech off-campus deserves wide
constitutional protection, especially when it cannot reasonably be argued that
the speech is “substantially disruptive,” per the Tinker standard,108 nor can it
be argued that professional students’ speech off-campus does not merit the
protections in line with the Court’s dicta in Morse v. Frederick.109
Furthermore, the age and maturity of professional students bears additional
consideration—Tinker, Hazelwood, and Morse all dealt with the K-12
101

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2015).
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519.
103
Id. at 520.
104
Id.
105
Id. (stating that the mortuary program’s rules required “respect, discretion, and
confidentiality”).
106
Id. at 521.
107
Id.
108
“The free speech rules in this area are pretty vague and can turn on subtle factual
differences.” Eugene Volokh, Teacher Disciplined for “Bullying” Student Who Had Put Up
a Swastika, REASON.COM (Oct. 22, 2018, 8:14 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/22/
teacher-disciplined-for-bullying-student (discussing whether a student’s posting of a swastika
on a “Spirit Wall” was constitutionally protected; stating that it’s possible the violation could
be “seen as disruptive enough to the school’s mission to be constitutionally unprotected”).
109
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401, 405 (2007).
102
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atmosphere.
2. Oyama’s Ejection for Curricular Speech
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals drew criticism from free speech
advocates with its 2015 decision in Oyama v. University of Hawaii.110
Oyama, who sought student teacher certification, wrote in a reflection paper
as part of his curricular work that he believed “online child predation should
be legal” and that “the age of consent should be either 0, or whatever age a
child is when puberty begins.”111
Although the decision to expel Oyama from the program can be
distinguished from the decision in Tatro because Oyama’s comments were
made in the course of academic curriculum (“on campus”), this decision is
pertinent to off-campus student speech in the professional program context
because of the Ninth Circuit’s precedent-setting three-pronged test for
evaluating whether a public university violates the First Amendment rights
of its students in the professional program context.112 The professional
standard is a constitutional restraint, according to the court, if it is: (1)
“directly related to defined and established professional standards”;113 (2)
narrowly tailored;114 and (3) employs “reasonable professional judgment.”115
In Oyama, the court found that the student’s speech was directly related to
defined and established professional standards and was narrowly tailored to
serve the university’s educational mission.116 This places Oyama more in
line with circuit court decisions that urge deference to the university’s
determination of professionalism within the academic curricular setting.117
This decision causes a problem for cases involving student speech in
professional programs because it allows the university to make decisions
regarding whether the student’s speech fits within the orthodoxy of
established academic standards. A potential unforeseen downside to this
would be that it could keep students from expressing contrarian views within
their academic setting. For example, sanctions against students can
encourage viewpoint discrimination by empowering universities to quiet
110
Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015). Susan Kruth, Ninth Circuit
Cites ‘Professional Standards’ in Allowing University to Punish Student Speech, FOUND. FOR
INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (FIRE) (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/ninth-circuitcites-professional-standards-in-allowing-university-to-punish-student-speech/.
111
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856.
112
Id. at 868. The court drew these prongs from student speech and employee speech
doctrines. Id.
113
Id. at 868.
114
Id. at 871.
115
Id. at 872.
116
Id. at 855.
117
See, e.g., Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Res. Univ., 777 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2015).
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students who express unpopular opinions but who have no other academic
performance problems.118
3. Keefe and “behavior unbecoming” of a nursing student
The most recent federal case to examine off-campus speech in the
professional program context is the Eighth Circuit’s 2016 decision in Keefe
v. Adams.119 Student Craig Keefe was removed from Minnesota’s Central
Lakes College nursing program for “behavior unbecoming of the profession
and transgression of professional boundaries” through his Facebook posts.120
On his Facebook page, Keefe had posted: “Doesnt [sic] anyone know or have
heard of mechanical pencils. Im [sic] going to take this electric pencil
sharpener in this class and give someone a hemopneumothorax [a trauma
where the lung is punctured] with it before to [sic] long. I might need some
anger management.”121 Keefe also directed a public post at a classmate
specifically:
LMAO [sic] [a classmate], you keep reporting my post and get me
banded [sic]. I don’t really care. If thats [sic] the smartest thing
you can come up with than I completely understand why your [sic]
going to fail out of the RN program you stupid bitchFalseAnd
quite [sic] creeping on my page. Your [sic] not a friend of mine
for a reason. If you don’t like what I have to say than [sic] don’t
come and ask me, thats [sic] basically what creeping is isn’t it.
Stay off my page . . .122
The Eighth Circuit said Keefe violated Central Lakes College’s student
ethics code, which includes an ethical standard prohibiting “behavior
unbecoming of the Nursing Profession.”123 The school’s director of nursing
testified that she felt she could not teach Keefe, and that he would not be able
to attain the level of professionalism required.124 She testified that she
“understood his [First Amendment] rights but this was about
professionalism.”125 The Eighth Circuit also said Keefe violated the Nurses
Association Code of Ethics, which integrates “personal and professional
identities.”126 This causes a disturbing lack of regard for a student’s right to

118
Ari Cohn, FIRE and Student Press Law Center File Brief in ‘Oyama v. University of
Hawaii’, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (FIRE) (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.thefire
.org/fire-and-student-press-law-center-file-brief-in-oyama-v-university-of-hawaii/.
119
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
120
Id. at 525.
121
Id. at 527.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 528.
124
Id. at 527.
125
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 527.
126
Id. at 529.
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free speech off-campus. Also troubling, the Eighth Circuit in Keefe melded
the Tinker and Hazelwood standards, holding that speech that does not
comply with professional standards, regardless of whether that speech is onor off-campus, necessarily “materially disrupts” the school’s “legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”127
It bears repeating that Keefe involved an adult student in a professional
nursing program, whereas Tinker and Hazelwood involved public high
school, on-campus free speech, and thus “are not the appropriate standards
for evaluating whether a university may regulate a student’s off-campus
speech that is non-school-sponsored and unrelated to academic activities.”128
Judge Kelly’s dissent in Keefe focused on this distinction, stating that
Hazelwood “does not allow retaliation against disfavored speech that occurs
outside the classroom.”129 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit erred in
comparing Keefe to Ward v. Polite.130 The latter involved a student refusing
to treat patients based on that student’s religious objections to the patients’
sexual orientation.131 The two cases are factually incongruous; Keefe was
not dealing in a professional capacity in his Facebook posts. Courts must
not look to the standards set forth in Tinker and Hazelwood but must treat
students in professional university programs as mature adults who are not in
need of the same paternalistic stance.
The distinction between professional speech and private speech is a
special concern when dealing with adults who are students, but who are not
yet considered members of a profession. Daniel Halberstam and Robert
Post, both constitutional law scholars, distinguish professional speech,
defined as “‘speech . . . uttered in the course of professional practice,’ as
distinct from ‘speech . . . uttered by a professional.’”132 This separation of
identity, if applied to professional students’ speech off-campus, would
provide much-needed breathing room for the student while preserving
oversight for situations such as Ward v. Polite,133 where a professional
student is acting in a professional, curricular capacity. It could also prompt
a court to re-examine its reasoning in Keefe and more fittingly decide that
Keefe’s comments on his Facebook page were substantially disruptive, or
that they could have constituted true threats.
127

Id. at 531.
Wahrmann-Harry, supra note 15, at 445–46.
129
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 542 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664
F.3d 865, 882 (11th Cir. 2011) (Pryor, J., concurring)).
130
See id. at 532.
131
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2012).
132
Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1253 (2016) (citing Robert
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (2007)).
133
See discussion of Ward v. Polite, supra Part II.B.
128
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III. “LEGITIMATE PEDAGOGICAL CONCERN” AND THE ROLE OF THE
UNIVERSITY IN ENFORCING PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
Because Hazelwood does not properly apply to off-campus graduate/
professional student speech, a crucial part of our analysis is to deconstruct
the rationale behind the precedent that a professional standard must be
related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”134 Defining “legitimate
pedagogical concern,” although a vague standard to begin with, is more
straightforward when in the K-12 context. It becomes a more philosophical
question when dealing with adults in the professional/graduate public
university setting. As the Third Circuit held in 2010, “[c]onsiderations of
maturity are not nearly as important for university students, most of whom
are already over the age of 18 and entrusted with a panoply of rights and
responsibilities as legal adults.”135
If the purpose (or “legitimate pedagogical concern”) of the university
is to protect its students’ future career prospects, we must evaluate the in loco
parentis doctrine. From the mid-1800s until the 1960s, universities were
generally permitted to act “in the place of a parent” toward their students,
which meant that a student’s constitutional rights were “stopped at the
college gates.”136 This came to an end around 1961, with the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, where nine African
American students were expelled from Alabama State College without
notice or a hearing.137 This was a due process case in which the students had
been expelled for violating a state law that racially segregated lunch
counters.138 The court decided that an academic hearing was necessary
“prior to expulsion from a state college or university.”139 Thus, disciplinary
hearings as a result of a professional student’s off-campus speech may face
review under the court’s procedural due process standard.140
The professional student’s free speech rights do not end at the gates of
the public university. Although professional students’ off-campus speech
deserves robust protection by the Court, universities and law enforcement
officials’ ability to discipline students based on unprotected speech should
remain untouched, with those statements falling into traditional categories

134

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).
136
Philip Lee, The Curious Life of In Loco Parentis in American Universities, 8 HIGHER
EDUC. IN REV. 65, 67 (2011).
137
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1961).
138
Id. at 153.
139
Id. at 158.
140
See Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 534–35 (8th Cir. 2016).
135

DEYRING (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

10/3/2019 7:01 PM

COMMENT

255

such as fighting words141 or true threats.142 Harassment, for example, could
be ripe for litigation in a public university setting,143 and is a more fitting
rubric for analysis in the case of Keefe.
Some argue that where there is no legitimate pedagogical concern,
schools “may not stop speech, even in a nonpublic forum.” 144 Many of the
public school speech cases invoke the rationale that the university may
restrict speech because it bears the imprimatur of the school itself via
professional certification.145 This may be justifiable in the context of
curricular speech, as in Oyama’s student teaching program. In contrast, in
the context of noncurricular speech, universities should not be granted vast
deference—especially when off-campus speech is unrelated to the
professional curriculum, is not undertaken as part of the student’s role in
providing services, and bears no imprimatur of the school itself. Statutory
certification schemes, such as the regulation in Tatro, do not absolve the
university of its responsibility to uphold the First Amendment as a state
actor.
The role of the university is to educate, and the institution is a state
actor bound to protect constitutional rights.
This constitutional
responsibility must outweigh the university’s compelling interest in
producing a commodity attractive for gainful employment. The “legitimate
pedagogical concern” analysis must necessarily be narrowed to exclude the
off-campus speech of mature students in professional programs who are not
yet licensed professionals. The decision whether to certify a graduate student
for entrance to a profession properly lies with the professional body, not with
the university (as a state actor that is bound to uphold the Constitution).
For example, although requirements for admission to law practice vary
by state, it’s possible for U.S. law students to attain a professional degree
(juris doctor, or JD), but nevertheless fail to pass a state’s bar examination,
or fail to pass a state’s moral character requirement, thus attaining a law
degree but failing to attain professional licensure.146 For the purposes of
sanctioning attorneys once they have been licensed, “the disciplinary body

141

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
See e.g, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
143
Ana Vieira Ayala, Hate Speech is Free Speech but Free Speech is Not Absolute: A
Look at the First Amendment and College Campuses, 81 TEX. B.J. 330, 330–31 (2018).
144
Jeff Sklar, Note, The Presses Won’t Stop Just Yet: Shaping Student Speech Rights in
the Wake of Hazelwood’s Application to Colleges, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 683 (2007).
145
See Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The
Certification Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382 (2013).
146
See Admission to the Bar in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wi
ki/Admission_to_practice_law#United_States (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
142
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bears the burden of proving falsity [of statements].”147
IV. CALVERT’S FOUR-PRONGED TEST AND UNFORESEEN OUTCOMES
First Amendment scholar and journalism professor Clay Calvert148
proposed a test which seeks to resolve cases dealing with free speech and
professional certification.149 Under the four prongs of Calvert’s suggested
test, a court must ensure that a public university’s enforcement of a
professional standard does not violate a student’s right to free speech by
evaluating the standard for its (1) precision; (2) essentiality; (3)
contextuality; and (4) proportionality.150
Calvert’s Precision Principle, the first prong of his test, requires that the
professional standard must be (1) codified by statute, or carry the imprimatur
of a professional interest group, and (2) survive a facial challenge for
vagueness.151 This prong hinges on how vague the professional standard is,
and what a court would subjectively consider vague.152 A statute can survive
a challenge for vagueness and still be too subjective. For example, recall
that in Keefe, the student was removed from the nursing program for a lack
of professionalism.153 The court called the nursing program’s professional
standards “necessarily quite general, but they are widely recognized and
followed.”154 It would not be a stretch to imagine a scenario where a court
would move the line between “vague” and “general” based on the subjective
perception of a university official who might disagree with a student’s
politically unpopular opinions.
Calvert’s Precision Principle could push the Keefe finding into
unconstitutional territory by virtue of the standards being too vague. Placing
such a determination in the hands of the Court could allow a university to
have unfettered reach into a student’s speech off-campus. Regardless, the
university, as a state actor, should not be in the position of enforcing a
standard that is too vague and that infringes constitutional rights. In
situations such as those involving a student’s expression off-campus, as in
Keefe and Tatro, the Court would do well to consider the student’s “taste and
style,” as described in its decision in Cohen v. California: “[O]ne man’s
147

Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438
(9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
148
JD, PhD, https://www.jou.ufl.edu/staff/clay-calvert/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
149
Calvert, supra note 9, at 648.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
See Calvert, supra note 9, at 650.
153
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 525 (8th Cir. 2016) (Keefe was removed from the
nursing program “for behavior unbecoming of the profession and transgression of
professional boundaries.”).
154
Id. at 532.
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vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual.”155
Calvert’s Essentiality Principle, the second prong of his four-pronged
test, calls for the Court to require that compliance with the professional
standard be essential to the student’s “professional success following
graduation.”156 This prong would place the Court in the position of deciding
whether it would be necessary for a student to adhere to a professional
standard in order to attain professional success post-graduation.157 The Court
would decide this by deferring to the university, which could impede the
Court from adjudicating a constitutional matter. Furthermore, it raises the
specter of student as commodity, which necessarily forces the Court to
choose whether the university’s role (or, legitimate pedagogical concern) is
to educate students, or to produce students that are employable. Professional
success could easily be defined so broadly as to restrict other constitutionally
protected speech off-campus. The Court must scrutinize all professional
licensing standards to ensure that students’ right to free speech off-campus
is not infringed.
Calvert’s Contextuality Principle, the third of his four-prong test,
requires that “[i]mposition of the professional standard . . . not place an
undue burden on the free-speech rights of the student in nonprofessional
contexts and nonacademic settings . . . .”158 This principle should be further
refined along the lines of cases that distinguish student speech on-campus
and off-campus. For example, the test could make clear that while student
speech in the curricular context can be restricted in line with the holdings in
Hazelwood and Oyama, student speech that occurs in an off-campus forum
and that bears no imprimatur of the school, such as with Keefe and Tatro,
should not be restricted by the university. Other than speech that is not
protected by the First Amendment, the Court should not place any burden on
the free-speech rights of the student in nonprofessional contexts and
nonacademic settings. Providing for a balancing test allows the university
to reach too far into the off-campus context. Free speech “balancing tests”
can be considered “free speech consequentialism,” where harms to one
interest must be weighed against another.159 This balancing necessarily
imparts a subjective determination on the part of the Court, “undermin[ing]
strong free speech protections” and threatening the neutrality guarantee of
155
156
157
158
159

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
Calvert, supra note 9, at 651.
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Calvert, supra note 9, at 648.
Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016).
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the First Amendment.160
Calvert’s Proportionality Principle, the final prong of his test, calls for
a measured disciplinary response to students’ violation of the professional
standard. In order to pass constitutional muster, the university’s sanction
against a student must be “narrowly limited,” or, if the student is expelled
from the program, the student must have been a repeat offender who ignores
warnings and “is unwilling or unable to uphold the standard.”161 It is unclear
which cases or precedent suggest that this would be an adequate measure to
educate the student. For example, Calvert begins by pointing to the fact that
Amanda Tatro was permitted to continue in her mortuary program “with a
failing grade in one laboratory course.”162 Calvert then points to evidentiary
levels of proof and an examination of deference to the university for how a
restriction on student speech might be constitutional.163 The wide deference
granted to the university in cases such as Tatro and Keefe show a strong trend
toward deference to the university that could create wide opportunity for
student speech to be curtailed, especially in situations where a university
could argue that its legitimate pedagogical interest is in orthodoxy of ideas.
Calvert’s test is an improvement over the current uncertain state of how
courts evaluate these cases. However, although it is based off the three
prongs set forth for curricular student speech in Oyama,164 Calvert’s fourpronged test fails to distinguish the fact that Oyama, unlike the students in
Tatro and Keefe, sought certification for employment in a public institution
(to teach in public schools).165 It is understandably alarming for a candidate
seeking to teach children to advocate for the legalization of child predation,
as Oyama did in his coursework.166 The Ninth Circuit in Oyama recognized
that the public employee free speech doctrine addresses this concern167 by
allowing vast deference to the judgment of the government employer.168
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Calvert, supra note 9, at 655.
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Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 868–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a
disciplinary decision must be based on well-established professional standards, must be
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Id. at 856.
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speech to fulfill its responsibilities to the public and to achieve its institutional objectives.”).
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Calvert suggests that if Oyama had advocated the same positions off campus,
the court would not have allowed the university to restrict his statements.169
Nevertheless, the Oyama court’s deference to the “professional standard”
could justify greater reach into a student’s speech, regardless of its setting—
an outcome not without its own potential downside.170
Professor Clay Calvert has suggested a workable test for professional
certification cases involving student speech. However, it does not
adequately account for the distinction between on-campus and off-campus
speech. The Supreme Court in Hazelwood made clear that schools have a
compelling interest in controlling student speech off-campus, provided it can
be considered “curricular”—if it bears the imprimatur of the school.171
Calvert’s test would be more effective in preserving students’ free speech
rights if it declared their noncurricular speech off-campus generally off
limits. Existing laws against harassment, true threats, and fighting words
could adequately address many of these concerns without infringing on
students’ rights to free speech.172
V. CONCLUSION
As an educational institution, the university has an interest in teaching
its students what the licensing body or professional standard will be upon
graduation. The university may caution its students that they are at risk of
not being able to obtain employment or certification. But expulsion (or
discipline that results in failure from the program) for off-campus noncurricular speech infringes students’ constitutional rights.
The university should be in the role of educator, notifying students that
their off-campus conduct would not be acceptable under professional
guidelines and could reduce their chances of attaining employment once they
graduate.
The Supreme Court should clarify this area and urge universities to step
169

Calvert, supra note 9, at 643–45.
But see Eugene Volokh, Opinion (The Volokh Conspiracy), Okay to Dismiss
Professional School Students for Expressing ‘Views . . . Deemed Not in Alignment with
Standards Set by’ Government Authorities, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/29/okay-to-dismissprofessional-school-students-for-expressing-views-deemed-not-in-alignment-withstandards-set-by-government-authorities/ (“[D]espite the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to impose
some limits on its ‘professional standards’ rationale, this sort of analysis is poison to academic
freedom. . . . [T]he court’s rationale could let universities suppress a vast range of student
speech.”).
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Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (explaining that
educators are entitled to control student expression that “members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school”).
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Trego, supra note 14, at 119 (“[P]rofessional students should continue to be held to
the same free speech exceptions as the public, including restrictions on true threats.”).
170

DEYRING (DO NOT DELETE)

260

10/3/2019 7:01 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:237

out of the role of certification gatekeeper, keeping them properly in the role
of education provider. This would afford students the opportunity to learn
and be responsible for their own careers.

